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Between Brady Discretion and
Brady Misconduct
Bennett L. Gershman*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland
presented prosecutors with new professional challenges. In
Brady, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution must provide the defense with any evidence in its possession that could be
exculpatory. If the prosecution fails to timely turn over evidence
that materially undermines the defendant’s guilt, a reviewing
court must grant the defendant a new trial. While determining
whether evidence materially undermines a defendant’s guilt may
seem like a simple assessment, the real-life application of such a
determination can be complicated. The prosecution’s disclosure
determination can be complicated under the Brady paradigm because the prosecutor’s office is burdened with arguably conflicting obligations. On the one hand, the prosecution must build its
case against the accused in an adversarial system of justice. On
the other hand, the prosecution must assess each part of its investigation as to how and whether the defense could use the evidence. If the defense could possibly use the evidence, the
prosecutor must then determine whether that evidence must be
turned over under Brady or whether the prosecutor has the discretion not to disclose.
This paper discusses prosecutorial Brady dilemmas through
eight hypotheticals. The hypotheticals are not unusual types of
difficult problems that prosecutors face when building their
cases. The problems include issues related to possible prosecution witness impeachment material, lab reports that do not
clearly support the defendant’s guilt, codefendant testimony and
plea agreements, and conflicting eye witness accounts. After
presenting the hypotheticals, the paper works through each of
the problems and posits a conclusion about whether the prosecution has a Brady obligation to disclose the information to the
defense.
* Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law, Pace University.
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INTRODUCTION
Brady v. Maryland1 tests the prosecutor’s integrity. Prosecutors know that principles of due process and professional ethics require disclosure of materially favorable evidence in the prosecutor’s
possession to the defendant.2 Prosecutors know that doubts about
whether the evidence should be disclosed should be resolved in the
defendant’s favor,3 and that the prosecutor’s good-faith and honest
belief that the evidence is not favorable or material is irrelevant.4
Still, courts recognize that Brady has not displaced the adversary
system,5 and that a prosecutor is permitted to exercise considered
judgement, or discretion, in assessing the value of evidence to the
defense.6 This paper examines the scope of a prosecutor’s discretion under Brady to disclose evidence to the defense and the factors
that guide that discretion.
Below are eight problems in which a prosecutor must decide
whether Brady requires the disclosure of evidence to the defense.
The problems are not clear-cut. A responsible prosecutor seeking
to enforce her Brady duty would have to struggle with these
problems. A prosecutor would have to analyze the evidence carefully and attempt to predict how the defense could use this evidence
effectively, either in preparing or presenting its case. Then, the
prosecutor must weigh various factors that are relevant to the pros1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2. Id. at 87 (“We now hold that suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2018) (“The prosecutor in a criminal case shall . . . make timely disclosure to the
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense . . . .”).
3. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) (“[T]he prudent prosecutor
will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.”).
4. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
5. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (“The Brady rule is
based on the requirement of due process. Its purpose is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a
miscarriage of justice does not occur.”).
6. People v. Fein, 219 N.E.2d 274, 278 (N.Y. 1966). As the New York Court
of Appeals noted in People v. Fein:
[T]he public prosecutor—an experienced trial lawyer—must have some
area in which he is permitted to judge, in the context of the entire case,
the value of evidence to the defense in terms of its potential impact on
the jury; he must have some discretion in determining which evidence
must be turned over to the defense.
Id.
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ecutor’s exercise of Brady discretion.7 Of course, prosecutorial offices that operate under an “open file” discovery policy simplify
their disclosure task. Open file discovery policies constrain the
prosecutor’s discretion much more than traditional discovery policies.8 I assume in this discussion that no open file policy exists. I
also assume that the prosecutor in this discussion is sensitive to her
role to serve justice, understands the need to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial, and is cognizant of the need to protect the
community from lawbreakers.9
Problem 1
Tom was charged with the sale of drugs to Musgrove, an undercover agent in the sheriff’s department assigned to the narcotics
unit. According to Musgrove, he knew Tom from the street as a
drug dealer with a record of drug arrests and convictions. Musgrove, in his capacity as an undercover agent, approached Tom and
purchased $100 of cocaine from Tom. Tom denies the sale. He
claims that several months earlier, Musgrove asked Tom to sell a
large quantity of drugs for him and Tom refused. According to
Tom, his refusal to sell the drugs for Musgrove provided Musgrove
with a motive to set him up for the current drug charge. As the
state prosecutor is preparing her case for trial, Musgrove tells her
that he is under investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for
shaking down local drug dealers. Musgrove denies any wrongdoing. The U.S. Attorney’s Office refuses to discuss the investigation
with the state prosecutor. Tom goes to trial. The prosecutor does
not disclose to the defense that Musgrove is under federal investigation for narcotics offenses. Tom is convicted of selling drugs based
on Musgrove’s testimony. After Tom’s conviction, Musgrove is indicted, tried, and convicted of conspiracy to obstruct justice by federal authorities.
7. In discussing these problems, I assume the prosecutor has reviewed the
case file thoroughly and has interviewed the police investigators, complainants,
and witnesses. Nevertheless, the prosecutor’s task is complicated by the fact that
the prosecutor can make only a rough judgment as to how the evidence might be
used by defense in challenging the prosecutor’s case. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108
(“[T]he significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately
until the entire record is complete . . . .”).
8. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 283 n.23 (1999) (“[I]f a prosecutor asserts
that he complies with Brady through an open file policy, defense counsel may reasonably rely on that file to contain all materials the State is constitutionally obligated to disclose under Brady.”).
9. This is not the approach of some prosecutors. See generally Bennett L.
Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 531 (2007).
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Did the prosecutor have an obligation to disclose that Musgrove was under federal investigation?
Problem 2
Dan was charged with forcible rape. According to Veronica’s
testimony, she was on the side of a road in a rural community after
her car broke down when Dan drove up and offered to help her. It
was a chilly winter evening and Dan told her to wait in his car to
stay warm. After examining her car and checking the engine, Dan
told her she probably needed to be towed. He told her there was a
service station down the road. Veronica testified that Dan drove
her a short distance away, then stopped his car, held a knife to her
throat, bound her wrists, and raped her. Dan cut Veronica’s finger
when she held up her hands to ward off the attack. She bled on her
clothes and the car seat. Veronica testified that after the attack,
Dan threatened to kill her if she called the police. Veronica called
the police, however, once Dan drove her to a friend’s home. The
police took a statement from Veronica and brought her to a hospital. The examining doctor saw a fresh cut on her finger, which was
consistent with being cut with a sharp object. The doctor also saw
recent bruising on her wrists, which was consistent with being
bound by a rope.
Two weeks later, the police showed Veronica a series of photographs and she identified Dan. The police arrested Dan and
searched his car, where they found a knife, a rope, and blood stains
on the front seat. A forensic chemist performed serology tests on
the knife and the car seat. His report concluded that the blood on
the knife and the blood stains on the car seat did not match Veronica’s blood. The prosecutor concluded that the report was untrustworthy because the chemist was incompetent. The chemist had
twice failed proficiency tests, used inappropriate testing in analyzing the blood, used an insufficient number of samples, and failed to
follow proper laboratory protocols. The prosecutor, in her case-inchief, presented evidence of the blood stains on the knife, car seat,
and Veronica’s clothes, but did not call the chemist or introduce his
report.
Did the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the chemist’s report violate Brady?
Problem 3
Don was charged with capital murder. The prosecution’s theory of the case was that on the night of the murder, Don and his

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-3\DIK304.txt

2019]

unknown

BETWEEN BRADY DISCRETION

AND

Seq: 5

23-APR-19

BRADY MISCONDUCT

14:32

665

girlfriend Glenda hitched a ride from Vern in a van. The three went
to a campsite where they planned to camp out for the night. The
prosecution’s theory was that during the night, Don killed Vern by
hitting him several times in the head with a rock and dumped his
body down an embankment. The prosecution postulated that
Glenda cleaned the van and burned some bloody clothing and blankets. Don and Glenda then drove the van through several states
and used Vern’s credit card to make purchases. The stolen credit
card led to Don and Glenda’s arrests for Vern’s murder. Don confessed to murdering Vern. Glenda made a cooperation agreement
with the prosecution and testified against Don. Don also testified
and claimed that Glenda killed Vern after Vern tried to rape her.
He testified that he falsely confessed to murdering Vern to protect
Glenda, whom he thought was pregnant with his child. Glenda was
heavily cross-examined. Her testimony contradicted itself several
times and it appeared that she was coached.
A legal intern in the prosecutor’s office who participated in the
trial preparation and witness interviews, including Glenda, prepared a status report for the prosecution in which she concluded: “I
don’t believe Glenda’s story. I think she’s lying.” The intern’s report was not disclosed to the defense. Don was found guilty and
sentenced to death.
Does Brady require the prosecutor to disclose the intern’s status report?
Problem 4
Defendants Art and Bill, who were 18- and 20-years-old respectively, were charged with the robbery and murder of Mike.
The principal witness against them was Hal, a teenager who lived in
the same neighborhood as the defendants. According to Hal’s testimony, presented during the prosecution’s case-in-chief, Hal was riding his bicycle when he saw Art and Bill accost Mike as he left a 7/
11 store. Mike started running away, and Art and Bill gave chase.
According to Hal’s testimony, when they caught up with Mike, Art
and Bill began beating Mike, repeatedly kicking him in his face and
side. Hal said Art and Bill took Mike’s wallet. Hal said Art and
Bill ordered him to say nothing about what happened. The police
eventually questioned Hal and he reported what he saw, which led
to Art and Bill’s arrests. Hal identified the defendants in court.
Hal’s cross-examination suggested that the police initially suspected
Hal of being involved in the attack. A detective testified that he
believed Hal was merely a witness, although certain aspects of Hal’s
interrogation raised doubts about this assertion.
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The defense called several witnesses. One witness testified
that he saw Hal hitting Mike. Another witness testified that he saw
Hal running away from the attack with several other youths, none
of whom was Art or Bill. Two alibi witnesses also testified for the
defense. Sally, Bill’s girlfriend, testified that she was at her home
with Bill at the time of the attack. Sally’s sister, Jan, corroborated
Sally’s account. According to an investigative report contained in
the prosecution’s file, the police conducted an interview with Jan
four days before the trial. The investigative report reveals that Jan
said Hal was bragging to people about what he and his friends had
done to Mike.
Does Brady require the prosecution to disclose to the defense
the investigative report containing Jan’s interview?
Problem 5
Devlin and Sal were indicted by a federal grand jury for conspiracy to commit arson. The prosecutor’s theory of the case was
that two years before the indictment, Devlin paid Sal $50,000 to
burn down his warehouse. The prosecution believed Devlin wanted
to use the fire to recover insurance proceeds. When questioned by
the FBI, Sal initially professed ignorance. However, after months
of negotiations with federal prosecutors, Sal entered into a plea
agreement whereby he agreed to plead guilty to conspiracy to commit arson and give truthful testimony against Devlin. The prosecutor told Sal he would not make any specific promises for Sal’s
testimony. The prosecutor told Sal, however, that when witnesses
tell the truth and a prosecutor is able to get a conviction based on
that testimony, prosecutors usually take the witness’s cooperation
into account when making sentence recommendations. The prosecutor said he would consider Sal’s truthful testimony when making
Sal’s sentencing recommendation.
Sal testified at Devlin’s arson trial that Sal agreed to plead
guilty and that the prosecution had given no promises for his testimony. Sal also testified that he hoped the prosecutor would consider his testimony when he faced sentencing. Sal’s sentencing was
adjourned several times pending resolution of Devlin’s trial. After
Devlin’s conviction, Sal, who faced a statutory guideline of 20 years
in prison on his conspiracy plea, was sentenced to five years’
probation.
Did the prosecutor violate Brady when he did not correct Sal’s
statement that the prosecutor made no promises for Sal’s testimony
against Devlin?
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Problem 6
Dave was charged for Wally’s murder. The prosecution believed an assailant shot Wally twice in the chest as Wally was getting
into his car in a post office parking lot. The assailant fired the shots
from the roof of a shopping center. Dave, 22-years-old, was arrested within hours of the shooting. At the time of arrest, Dave’s
shoes and trousers were wet. The police found a tan raincoat and a
gray cap under a bush in a park near where the shooting occurred.
The prosecution’s evidence supporting Dave’s conviction for
the murder was largely circumstantial. Two eyewitnesses saw a man
jump from the roof of the shopping center and run to the nearby
park. They described him as young and as wearing a gray or blue
cap and a brownish coat. One of the witnesses said the assailant’s
pants had been wet, but could not identify Dave as the assailant.
The other witness believed Dave “looked something like” the man
he saw. Wally had been Dave’s supervisor in the post office mail
room. Witnesses testified to a heated relationship between them
and that Wally gave Dave a poor performance review the week
before Wally’s death. The murder weapon was found in a nearby
park. A witness testified that he had loaned Dave the gun found in
the park the previous year. The witness also testified that he had
asked for it back, but Dave said the gun had been stolen.
The prosecution asked the FBI crime lab to conduct scientific
tests of the gun, coat, cap, shoes, and clothing. The tests could not
establish whether the hat and coat found under the bush were associated with Dave. The crime lab could not lift any fingerprints from
the gun, nor could it match soil samples taken from Dave’s shoes
with the killer’s escape route. Lastly, the crime lab could not match
tar found on Dave’s shoes with tar on the shopping center roof.
Does Brady require the prosecutor to disclose the results of
these scientific tests?
Problem 7
Dolby was charged, tried, and convicted for sexually assaulting
Billy. Sometime before, administrators had transferred Billy, an 11year-old, from a residential treatment facility called Redhill, where
Billy resided for several months, to Grove, another residential
treatment facility. While at Grove, Billy accused staff member
Dolby of sexually assaulting him. The evidence presented at trial
consisted of Billy’s accusation and Dolby’s denial. Prior to admitting Billy to Grove, Grove’s Director of Programs, who was responsible for overseeing Grove’s programs for emotionally disturbed
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boys, interviewed Billy and his parents. The Director wrote an intake note which stated the following: that Billy had alleged that he
was sexually abused by staff members at Redhill; that Redhill investigated Billy’s allegations and found them to be false; that Billy had
expressed concern to Grove’s Director because he feared he would
be assaulted at Grove; and the Director’s opinion that Grove
needed to take special precautions to protect staff members from
false accusations if Billy was admitted.
Does Brady require the prosecutor to disclose this intake note?
Problem 8
Drago and Ed were charged with robbing an auto supply store
and shooting the clerk to death. Drago was charged as the shooter.
Ed made a deal with the prosecution to testify against Drago. At
Drago’s capital murder trial, Sally, who had a child with Drago, testified that Drago told her he robbed an auto supply store with Ed
and shot someone there. Ed pleaded guilty to the non-capital
charge of murder in the second degree. Ed testified that he drove
Drago to the store in his blue Ford and waited outside in the car
while Drago entered the store. Ed testified that Drago was in the
store for two or three minutes, then ran out of the store, and that
Drago stated that he “took care of the clerk.” The police recovered
the gun that fired the bullet that killed the clerk from a drain next
to the apartment complex where Drago resided with Sally. Assume
that the prosecutor has a statement from a witness named Wendi
that as she was leaving the auto supply store, she saw two men sitting in a blue car. The police report states that after viewing a
photo array, Wendi identified a person named Martin as one of the
persons in the car. Martin has one prior drug conviction and bears
a resemblance to Drago. There is no evidence that Martin knew
Drago or Ed. The prosecutor did not disclose Wendi’s identification of Martin, believing that Wendi had misidentified him.
Does Brady require the prosecutor to disclose Wendi’s
statement?
DISCUSSION
None of these problems present a clear-cut case for disclosure.
None of the problems involve the kinds of Brady issues that typically require remedial action by a court. Brady issues that typically
require remedial action involve evidence that the prosecutor suppressed evidence which is clearly exculpatory or that clearly undermines the credibility of an important prosecution witness. In
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several of the problems, the evidence of guilt is sufficiently strong
so that a reviewing court would likely not lack confidence in the
jury’s verdict. Since the reviewing court would not lack confidence
in the jury’s verdict, the court would probably view the prosecutor’s
nondisclosure as immaterial.10 When a court finds that
prosecutorial nondisclosure was immaterial, the court cannot take
remedial action. In some of the problems, however, the evidence of
guilt is much less compelling. In cases where evidence of guilt is
less compelling, the undisclosed evidence is more likely to have an
impact on the reviewing court’s confidence in the verdict.
A prosecutor’s discretion in deciding whether to disclose evidence before trial is often complicated. The prosecutor typically
does not know in advance of trial how the prosecution’s witnesses
will perform, how other evidence of guilt will unfold, and how the
defense will challenge the prosecution’s case.11 In many cases, the
prosecutor really cannot know whether the evidence in question
would create a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.”12 Because of the uncertainties related to the impact of evidence disclosure, the prosecutor should not inform her
Brady discretion, in most cases, on “playing the odds.”13 In other
words, a prosecutor should not base Brady discretion on a prospective evaluation of the materiality of the evidence before she knows
its real value.14 Indeed, if a prosecutor bases disclosure on her own
materiality of the evidence assessment, she would only disclose evidence if she believes the evidence could reasonably cause a jury to
acquit the defendant. Such a prosecutorial conclusion and disclosure is quite an implausible prospect.15
10. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (“The question is not
whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”).
11. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 (“[T]he significance of an item of evidence can
seldom be predicted accurately until the entire record is complete . . . .”).
12. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
13. Id. at 701 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he [Brady] standard invites a
prosecutor, whose interests are conflicting, to gamble, to play the odds . . . .”).
14. This situation is analogous to a situation in which a prosecutor at trial
weighs the commission of error or misconduct against a prediction that the evidence of guilt is so strong that any error or misconduct will be viewed by an appellate court as harmless. See Vilija Bilaisis, Comment, Harmless Error: Abettor of
Courtroom Misconduct, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 457, 470–71 (1983).
15. Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale
of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 653–54 (2002) (suggesting,
tongue in cheek, that after prosecutor discloses exculpatory evidence that presum-
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Every problem contains information that a defense lawyer
would like to have in advance of trial, either for preparing or
presenting its case. In most of the problems, the evidence is
favorable to the defense. The prosecutor, in administering Brady
responsibly, would need to make a careful, informed, and objective
analysis. As noted above, a prosecutor should resolve any doubts
in favor of disclosure. However, a prosecutor is not required to
seek out evidence for the defense,16 or disclose evidence that is of
little or no evidentiary value.17 Moreover, since a trial is an adversarial contest, a prosecutor is not obligated to disclose evidence that
a competent defense lawyer could obtain with reasonable diligence.18 Finally, a prosecutor knows that she has substantial discretion under Brady and that there are no bright lines or fixed rules.19
How should a prosecutor exercise discretion? What are the factors
that should guide that discretion? The Supreme Court hasn’t given
direct answers to these questions. The remainder of this paper,
however, explores each problem from above in an attempt to resolve the questions of Brady discretion or violation through applying available Supreme Court rulings.
Problem 1: Is It Evidence?
In Problem 1, the prosecutor possesses information that might
affect the credibility of his principal witness. The prosecutor learns
that the undercover officer, who claims to have purchased drugs
from the defendant, is himself under investigation by another prosecutor’s office in an unrelated narcotics investigation. Should the
prosecutor disclose this information to the defense? Could a prosecutor reasonably believe that a jury would consider this information
to support the defense theory that the agent may have had a vendetta against the defendant, and therefore had a motive to give
false testimony?
ably undermines prosecutor’s confidence in a guilty verdict, the prosecutor may
then continue to zealously seek a conviction).
16. United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 261 (5th Cir. 1990) (“[Brady] does
not place any burden upon the [g]overnment to conduct a defendant’s investigation or assist in the presentation of the defense’s case.”); In re Littlefield, 851 P.2d
42, 51 (Cal. 1993) (“[T]he prosecution has no general duty to seek out, obtain, and
disclose all evidence that might be beneficial to the defense.”).
17. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (stating that only when
there is “substantial basis” for claiming evidence is favorable must the evidence be
disclosed).
18. United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 141 (3d Cir. 2015).
19. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 (noting that Brady articulates an “inevitably imprecise standard”).
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Assume in this problem that an experienced prosecutor, in analyzing the information, considers how the defense could use information about the prosecution’s witnesses. How the defense could
use information in the prosecution’s possession is a critical question
for any responsible prosecutor making a Brady disclosure decision.
The prosecutor might speculate that if the defense knew that the
agent was under investigation, the defense might have a stronger
reason to vigorously investigate the witness. The defense could ascertain why the agent is suspected of wrongdoing and try to expose
on cross-examination that the agent is lying about the defendant’s
drug sale.
However, the prosecutor almost certainly would conclude that
the defense would not be able to use this information to impeach
the officer’s testimony. The Rules of Evidence require a judge to
exclude any reference to the officer’s alleged misconduct in an unrelated drug case because such information would be considered
inadmissible character evidence.20 Moreover, a prosecutor is under
no duty to investigate the background of its witnesses, including police witnesses, in order to ascertain whether any negative or derogatory information about that witness exists.21 Indeed, after the alert
from the agent himself, the prosecutor in this problem did seek to
ascertain the status of the case. The prosecutor in the problem
checked whether there was anything in the agent’s background that
might affect his truthfulness as a witness.22
Even if we assume that the agent is under criminal investigation, there is no basis to characterize the information as “evidence”
within the meaning of Brady. Assuming the defense could not have
used the information either in questioning the witness or in argu20. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (“Evidence of a person’s character or character
trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character or trait.”). Even if this information showed that the
agent was untruthful, or was charged with criminal conduct relating to his untruthfulness, it still could not be used to impeach his credibility. See FED. R. EVID.
608(b) (“By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any privilege
against self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to the witness’s character
for truthfulness.”).
21. See People v. Jordan, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434, 443 (Ct. App. 2003) (“The
rule proposed . . . would require the People to catalog the testimony of every
witness called by the defense at every criminal trial in the county, cull from that
testimony complaints about peace officers and disclose these complaints to the
defense whenever the People called the peace officer as a witness at another
trial.”).
22. It is also possible that a defense lawyer may be able to investigate witnesses called by the prosecution to try to learn about any derogatory information.
While this may be a daunting task for overwhelmed and underfunded defense lawyers, it still may be doable.
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ment to the jury, the information could have had no direct impact
on the outcome of the trial.23
Thus, since information about the investigation of the agent
would not be admissible, the prosecutor could conclude that disclosure would have made no difference with respect to how the defense prepared or presented its case. The information could not
have affected the jury’s verdict. The prosecutor’s decision not to
disclose the information is well within the prosecutor’s proper exercise of Brady discretion.
Problem 2: Is the Evidence Reliable?
Problem 2 tests a prosecutor’s objectivity and integrity. Problem 2 contains a very strong case against Dan for raping Veronica.
She made a prompt complaint and identified Dan from a lineup. A
doctor corroborated her knife wounds. A knife, rope, and blood
stains were discovered in Dan’s car. The combination of the evidence strongly corroborates Veronica’s account. The prosecutor,
however, faces a damaging piece of evidence: a chemist retained by
the prosecution conducted serology tests on the blood found on the
knife and car seat, and concluded that the blood type did not match
Veronica’s. But the prosecutor has good reason to disbelieve the
chemist’s conclusions. The prosecutor has a valid basis to believe
the chemist is unqualified and the tests unreliable.
On the other hand, the test results are favorable and tend to
exculpate the defendant. The prosecutor has decided neither to call
the chemist nor introduce his reports. The prosecutor, in enforcing
her Brady duty, has to make a decision about what information she
must disclose to the defense. The prosecutor has three options: (1)
disclose the test results and the chemist’s incompetency; (2) disclose
only the test results; or (3) disclose neither the test results nor the
chemist’s incompetency.
The most transparent approach, of course, would be for the
prosecutor to disclose both the test results and the chemist’s incompetency. The defense would then be in a position to call the chemist at trial and introduce his report into evidence. In that scenario,
the defense should be prepared to respond to the prosecutor’s expected attack on the chemist’s qualifications and the report’s unreliability. The defense would also be in a position to call its own
serology expert. A defense decision to call its own serology expert
23. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6 (1995) (stating that polygraph
results were not evidence because disclosure could have had no direct effect on the
outcome of trial).
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would have its own risks, however. The retention of its own expert
could expose that the defense believed that the prosecution’s expert
really was unqualified and the tests unreliable.
If the prosecutor disclosed the report, but hid the evidence that
the chemist was incompetent, the defense would readily seek to use
the evidence without knowing that the chemist was incompetent
and the tests unreliable. The defense would likely be blindsided by
the prosecutor’s gambit; the defense would probably present what it
believed to be clearly exculpatory evidence, and then face a challenge by the prosecutor to its admissibility. In addition, if it did not
know about the expert’s incompetency in advance, the defense
could reasonably rely on the prosecution’s expert and not call its
own expert. One might view disclosure of the reports but not the
expert’s incompetence as an example of a prosecutor’s Brady
gamesmanship. Gamesmanship of this type is arguably conduct
that undermines the prosecutor’s role to serve justice.
Finally, in exercising his discretion, the prosecutor might decide to disclose neither the chemist’s reports nor evidence of the
chemist’s incompetency. The prosecutor might make this decision
on the basis of several factors. First, the prosecutor might believe
the evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that the chemist’s reports
and incompetence would not be material. As noted above, however, a conclusion of materiality should rarely be a factor in a prosecutor’s discretionary decision about whether to disclose. Secondly,
the prosecutor may conclude he is not obligated to disclose the
chemist’s reports and incompetence because the incompetence arguably renders the reports non-exculpatory. There is no basis, however, for the prosecutor to conclude that the evidence is not
exculpatory—it clearly is. Thirdly, the prosecutor may conclude
that disclosure of the incompetent chemist’s reports and history
might actually subvert the defendant’s right to a fair trial. If the
chemist lacks the qualifications to be a reliable expert and the tests
are unreliable, then a prosecutor might reasonably conclude no disclosure is appropriate, given the very strong rape prosecution. The
prosecutor could conclude no disclosure in this case is appropriate
because the constitutional and ethical rules of disclosure are intended to protect a defendant’s right to a fair trial. The purpose of
disclosure is arguably perverted if a guilty defendant uses the rules
to obtain unreliable evidence that thwarts the ends of justice. Finally, the prosecutor might further contend that if the defense really believed the blood in the car did not match the victim’s blood,
it could have retained its own expert to prove the fact.
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In exercising Brady discretion, the safest course for a prosecutor would be to follow the first option and make a full disclosure of
the chemist’s background and conclusions. The prosecutor would
then let the defense decide how to use the evidence. The prosecutor could argue against the admissibility of the test results at trial.
If the defense called the chemist and the judge allowed him to testify, the prosecutor could impeach the expert’s qualifications and
the reliability of the report. While the full disclosure option exposes the prosecution to additional hurdles in court, that route arguably aligns the closest with the prosecutor’s role as an arbiter of
justice. The second option is arguably the most troubling because
the prosecution’s disclosure tactic tricks the defense into believing
the report is significant evidence that impeaches the victim’s credibility. Further, the partial disclosure would likely lead the defense
not to call its own expert. The option in which the prosecutor discloses the chemist’s report, but conceals evidence of the chemist’s
incompetency, is ethically questionable. Even though the decision
may be ethically questionable, however, it probably would not be a
sufficient basis to reverse the conviction. A reviewing court would
likely conclude that since the defense had the reports and could use
the reports in whatever way it chose, the prosecution had fulfilled
its Brady duties.
Finally, would a reviewing court also sustain the prosecutor’s
exercise of discretion under the third option in not disclosing the
expert, his report, and his lack of qualifications? The answer, in all
likelihood, would be “yes.” As discussed above, a reviewing court
would likely conclude that the evidence of guilt is so strong that
there is no reasonable probability that disclosure of the reports and
the chemist’s incompetence would have changed the verdict.
In sum, Problem 2 presents an instance in which a prosecutor
has to make a difficult good-faith determination. The prosecution
must manage seemingly exculpatory evidence that is so unreliable
that disclosing it would arm the defense with evidence that could
subvert a fair prosecution. If the prosecutor does not make a full
disclosure of the expert’s report and lack of qualifications, the prosecutor’s conduct could arguably reflect conduct of an interested advocate. The prosecutor would make a partial disclosure decision in
her own self-interest, similar to a fox guarding a henhouse.
Whether this critique is applicable in this case, however, is unclear.
Problem 3: Is the Evidence Work Product?
Problem 3 involves an aspect of Brady jurisprudence that remains unsettled: whether a prosecutor is required to disclose infor-
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mation that may be favorable to a defendant, but constitutes an
attorney’s opinions, mental impressions, summaries of interviews
with witnesses, notes and communications with other law enforcement officials, and legal theories. Such material that either side of
the case develops is typically entitled to the so-called “work product” privilege.24 Recall that in this problem, the defendant is
charged with capital murder. The evidence against the defendant
appears to support a strong case for his guilt. The defendant confessed, and his girlfriend Glenda—likely an accomplice—testified
to the defendant’s guilt. After the prosecution’s debrief of Glenda,
however, an intern on the prosecution’s legal team prepared a status report that concludes the girlfriend is not telling the truth. The
prosecutor does not disclose the intern’s report to the defense.
Problem 3 presents an unclear Brady issue. Significantly, the
problem does not make clear exactly why the intern came to that
conclusion. If Glenda had reported certain facts that were exculpatory or made statements that were inconsistent with her testimony,
or were contradicted by other evidence, such information would be
favorable to the defense and would require disclosure. The prosecutor would have no discretion to conceal such evidence; Brady
mandates disclosure. If, however, the intern concluded that
Glenda’s account was not credible based on the intern’s own observations and judgments, then disclosure of that opinion is arguably
subject to the prosecution’s discretion. The intern could have arrived at the conclusion that Glenda was dishonest either because of
the manner in which she related her story, or because her recitation
of facts were embellished, or because of the witness’s self-interest in
entering into the cooperation agreement and testifying against Don.
The intern’s opinions based on her own analysis of Glenda could be
considered work product and privileged from disclosure.
The Supreme Court has not decided whether opinion work
product is within the scope of the Brady rule. Some lower courts
that have considered the question have held that opinion work
product typically is not disclosable to the defense for impeachment
24. See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (finding an adverse
party generally may not compel discovery of materials prepared by or for an attorney in the course of legal representation). The Supreme Court has not decided
whether a prosecutor’s “work product” must be disclosed under Brady. See
Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1133 n.63 (11th Cir. 2000). Lower courts have
addressed whether Brady extends to a prosecutor’s work product. See Morris v.
Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 742 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding Brady does not extend to prosecutor’s work product because it “would greatly impair the government’s ability to
prepare for trials”); Williamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1177, 1182 (11th Cir. 2000)
(same).
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purposes.25 Otherwise, these courts conclude, prosecutors might
not memorialize in writing opinions that may be at variance with
the prosecutor’s theory of the case or that may contain negative
comments about a witness’s account or credibility.26 According to
these courts, a finding of mandatory Brady disclosure for opinion
work product would result in inefficient, unfair, and sharp practices
in the preparation of a case for trial.27 Moreover, as noted above,
the Brady rule was not intended to displace the adversary system.
If the rules of disclosure required a prosecutor to disclose trial strategies, opinions about witnesses, and legal theories, the rules would
seriously undercut the role of the adversary system and impede a
prosecutor’s ability to prepare for trial.
Thus, until the Supreme Court provides a more definitive ruling on whether Brady includes a prosecutor’s work product, a prosecutor has broad discretion to withhold opinions and impressions
that relate to the theory of the case, witness preparation, and contested trial issues.
Problem 4: Does the Defendant Know, or Should the Defendant
Know, About the Evidence?
Problem 4 involves a prosecutor’s nondisclosure of information
favorable to the defense from an alibi witness that the defense calls
at trial. This problem highlights a recurring issue that courts have
often addressed: whether a prosecutor suppresses information
within the meaning of Brady if the defense already knows about the
information or with reasonable diligence could discover it.28 The
issue raises the question of how much discretion a prosecutor has
not to disclose evidence that the prosecutor reasonably believes the
defense already knows or that the defense has sufficient access to
the evidence to easily learn about it.
In this problem, Hal is the prosecution’s principal eyewitness.
Hal testified that Art and Bill viciously beat up Mike and stole
Mike’s wallet. Recall that the police initially suspected Hal and
there was some basis to believe that Hal may have participated in
the assault. Eyewitnesses testified that Hal was involved in assault25. See, e.g., Morris, 447 F.3d at 742; Williamson, 221 F.3d at 1182.
26. See Williamson, 221 F.3d at 1182.
27. Id.
28. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (stating Brady applies to
situations “involv[ing] the discovery, after trial, of evidence which had been known
to the prosecution but unknown to the defense”); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66,
96 (1967) (“Any allegation of suppression boils down to an assessment of what the
State knows at trial in comparison to the knowledge held by the defense.”) (White,
J., concurring).
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ing Mike and that they saw Hal run away from the attack with other
youths. A police report in the prosecutor’s files contained an interview with Jan, an alibi witness for one of the defendants. In the
interview, Jan stated that Hal had been bragging to people about
what he and his friends had done to Mike. Jan’s statement is clearly
favorable to the defense because it can be used to impeach Hal.
Jan, however, is a defense witness. Can the prosecutor assume that
Jan made the same statement to defense counsel that she made to
the police investigator about Hal implicating himself in the assault?
Is the prosecutor’s assumption reasonable? And even if it is reasonable for the prosecutor to believe that the defense may know
about Jan’s statement, is there any reason why the prosecutor
should not disclose it anyway?
On one hand, decisions interpreting Brady typically indicate
that a prosecutor is required to disclose favorable evidence which is
unknown to the defense.29 On the other hand, a prosecutor has no
duty to disclose evidence that the defense already knows or should
know.30 Even if a defendant has no actual knowledge of the evidence, a prosecutor has not suppressed evidence for purposes of
Brady if the defense, with reasonable diligence, could have discovered the evidence.31 Nevertheless, even though evidence theoretically may be available to the defense, it does not necessarily follow
that the evidence is available in fact for purposes of determining
whether Brady applies.
The prosecution must embark on a fact-intensive analysis to
determine whether the defense knows or should reasonably know
about particular evidence. Consider, for example, a scenario where
favorable evidence was contained in a public record. Could a prosecutor avoid disclosure obligations simply by assuming that a defendant has access to that public record? Even before arriving at the
conclusion that the defense has access to the public record, the
prosecution is assuming that the defendant already knows that a

29. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103; Giles, 386 U.S. at 96.
30. Smith v. State, 541 S.W.2d 831, 838 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (finding to
permit a defendant who knew of the existence of the suppressed evidence later to
claim error “would be to allow one to take a free ride during the trial and if he is
not satisfied with the result he can always get a new trial”).
31. United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 973 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Brady does
not oblige the government to provide defendants with evidence that they could
obtain from other sources by exercising reasonable diligence.”); United States v.
LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Evidence is not ‘suppressed’ if the defendant either knew, or should have known, of the essential facts permitting him to
take advantage of any exculpatory evidence.” (citations omitted)).
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public record exists and contains favorable information.32 The
question posed by Problem 4 is similar: would a reasonably diligent
defense attorney know that the witness possesses favorable evidence apart from the alibi evidence already imparted by the witness? If the prosecutor maintained an open file policy, the
additional defense-favorable evidence would presumably be available to the defense. Absent an open file policy, is Jan’s evidence
reasonably available for purposes of Brady? Is it within a prosecutor’s Brady discretion to refuse to disclose the evidence?
Whether even the most diligent defense attorney would be
able to learn about all information that a defense witness might
possess is questionable. Some defense witnesses might not remember certain facts, or might be reluctant to reveal some information,
or might simply be uncooperative. Most prosecutors know that defense lawyers might not be alert to the importance of asking defense witnesses about matters unrelated to the witness’s primary
role in the case. Prosecutors should not believe, however, that defense counsel must go on fishing expeditions with every defense
witness to try to learn everything contained in the witness’s mind.
The defense lawyer certainly should review available documents and be charged with knowledge of the documents’ content.
In the absence of documentary evidence, however, the prosecutor
should expect certain obvious limits to what a defense lawyer
knows to ask a live witness about. A prosecutor can properly use
discretion to weed out farfetched claims of ignorance. The prosecutor can also use discretion to prevent defense lawyers from blindsiding the prosecutor with claims that the defense does not know of
evidence that any reasonably competent lawyer should know. On
the other hand, a prosecutor seeking justice should not take advantage of a defense lawyer’s reasonable ignorance. As the Supreme
Court observed, “A rule thus declaring ‘prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek’ is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound
to accord defendants due process.”33
In Problem 4, the information that the defense has about Jan
relates to her role as an alibi witness. Arguably, defense counsel
does not have reason to ask Jan questions about Hal’s role in the
case or whether Hal may have made statements to other persons
32. Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding no
requirement that prisoner exercise “due diligence” in trying to discover public
records of prosecution’s key witness); United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1209
(2d Cir. 1995) (finding defense had no reason to know that government witness’s
affidavit had been filed in court prior to guilty plea).
33. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 696 (2004).
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about the case. Under the analysis above that concludes the defense counsel in Problem 4 cannot reasonably know to question Jan
about Hal’s involvement, the prosecutor should not conceal Jan’s
statement under the guise of discretion.
Problem 5: Has Evidence Been Suppressed?
Problem 5 involves a Brady issue that has divided the lower
courts: whether a prosecutor is required to disclose a cooperation
and plea agreement with a witness. Significant to Problem 5’s analysis is that there was no explicit agreement between the prosecutor
and the witness that the witness will receive a substantial benefit for
providing favorable testimony for the prosecutor. The prosecutor,
however, led the witness to believe that the witness would receive
favorable treatment if he helped the prosecution. Further, the witness, after testifying, did in fact receive a substantial sentence reduction for cooperating.34
Problem 5 presents what is a so-called “tacit promise.” A tacit
promise may be prosecutorial subterfuge to avoid Brady disclosure.
The prosecutorial strategy in Problem 5 arguably permits a witness
to testify truthfully that the prosecutor made no promises that the
witness would receive favorable treatment for his testimony. The
strategy also allows the prosecutor to represent that he made no
promises to the witness for the testimony. Certainly, a prosecutor
has broad authority to condition a witness’s cooperation on giving
truthful testimony without making any specific promise about benefits the witness might receive for his testimony. If, however, a review of the circumstances suggests that the witness had reason to
believe that the prosecution would consider the witness’s cooperation favorably, the conviction could face remedial action. The conviction could face remedial action even if the prosecutor did not
verbalize or memorialize his intent to help the witness. A court
reviewing the arrangement might conclude that the prosecutor
made an implicit or tacit promise to the witness, which, under
Brady, the prosecutor must disclose.35
The facts of any case, of course, are critical when analyzing
whether the prosecution made a tacit promise. In this problem, the
34. Compare Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1186 (10th Cir. 2009)
(“Like the majority of our sister circuits, we conclude that Brady requires disclosure of tacit agreements between the prosecutor and a witness.”), with Shabazz v.
Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 163–65 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding a tacit agreement not covered
by Brady where prosecutor does not explicitly promise anything to witness prior to
witness’s testimony).
35. Douglas, 560 F.3d at 1186 (“A deal is a deal—explicit or tacit. There is no
logic that supports distinguishing between the two.”).
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prosecutor spoke generally to Sal about the consequences of Sal’s
plea and cooperation. The prosecutor told Sal that he would consider Sal’s testimony as a basis for making his sentence recommendation. The prosecutor told Sal that although he would not promise
Sal any specific benefit, if Sal testified truthfully, the prosecutor
would consider the testimony in making a sentence recommendation. Recall that in the problem, the prosecutor added that when a
witness tells the truth and a prosecutor obtains a conviction based
on the testimony of that witness, prosecutors usually take that cooperation and testimony into account when making a sentence recommendation. Did the prosecutor communicate to Sal his implicit
intent to help Sal? Did Sal reasonably understand the prosecutor’s
statements as a tacit promise? Does the prosecutor have discretion
to conceal the details of the arrangement?
In addition to the prosecutor’s general statements, the prosecutor also successfully requested that the court adjourn Sal’s sentence
several times until Devlin’s trial completed. Sal’s delayed sentencing leaves the unmistakable impression that the prosecutor wanted
Sal’s sentence to remain uncertain until the conclusion of Devlin’s
trial. If Sal’s sentence remained uncertain, Sal would continue to
believe that he needed to help the prosecutor to get the prosecutor
to reward him. Indeed, the prosecutor rewarded Sal handsomely,
and recommended that Sal receive a sentence of probation, even
though he faced a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years
incarceration.
A court might find that the prosecutor has no discretion to
conceal statements that might reasonably communicate to a witness
that the prosecutor intends to reward the witness’s cooperation at
sentencing. Courts have held that “[a] deal is a deal,” however it is
disguised.36 Under the view that a deal is a deal, no matter how the
deal is disguised, the prosecutor in such a case would have no discretion to argue that no deal was made, even a tacit deal. To satisfy
Brady obligations, the prosecutor would need to alert the defense,
court, and jury that the prosecutor made a tacit promise to the witness. The witness would then have to testify that he understood
from the prosecutor’s statements that he would receive a benefit for
his testimony.
Problem 6: Is the Evidence Favorable?
Problem 6 involves the prosecution of Dave for the shooting
murder of Wally. The prosecution’s case rested entirely on circum36. Id.
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stantial evidence. When Dave was arrested within hours of the
shooting, his shoes and trousers were wet. The police found a tan
raincoat and a gray cap under a bush in a park near the shooting.
Recall that two witnesses saw a man jump from the roof of a shopping center and run to a nearby park. The witnesses described the
shooter as young and wearing a gray or blue cap and a brownish
coat. One witness could not identify Dave as the shooter, but said
the shooter’s pants had been wet. The other witness said Dave
“looked something like” the man he saw jump from the roof. The
gun used to kill the deceased was at one time in Dave’s sole possession. Additionally, the facts suggest that Dave had a motive to kill
the deceased.
The prosecution successfully admitted the gun, coat, hat, pants,
and shoes belonging to Dave into evidence. The collection of circumstantial evidence provides a strong case connecting Dave to the
murder. The prosecutor had the items scientifically tested, but the
results of the tests were inconclusive. Is the prosecutor required to
disclose these inconclusive test results or does the prosecutor have
discretion to conceal the results? A prosecutor reviewing the test
results evidence could reasonably conclude that because the tests
do not connect Dave to the murder, they are not favorable evidence. The prosecutor could conclude, rather, that the test results
are neutral evidence. If the test results are neutral evidence, the
prosecutor, in the exercise of Brady discretion, may properly decide
there is no obligation to disclose the test results.
The determination that the prosecutor could justifiably conceal
the inconclusive test results may be troubling. To be sure, if a particular item of evidence, like a gun, does not contain identifiable
fingerprints, most courts would probably conclude that the absence
of the defendant’s fingerprints on a gun is not necessarily favorable
to the defendant. Since the information is not necessarily favorable
to the defendant, then the prosecutor may reasonably consider the
evidence not covered by Brady disclosure requirements.37 Problem
6, however, is different in an important way. Problem 6 presents a
fact pattern where many scientifically tested evidentiary items, any
one of which could have linked the defendant to the crime, did not
in fact connect him to the crime at all. The cumulative array of
proof that did not identify the defendant might lead a prosecutor to
reasonably conclude that the absence of any connection is not neutral, but actually favorable.

37. See Commonwealth v. Corliss, 23 N.E.3d 92, 101–02 (Mass. 2015).
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Indeed, a prosecutor could certainly anticipate that a defense
lawyer challenging the prosecution’s case would aggressively exploit these negative test results. At trial, the defense lawyer should
disassociate the defendant from each of the items of circumstantial
evidence that the prosecution introduces. The defense lawyer could
make the logical argument that although any one of the multiple
scientifically tested items could have matched to the defendant,
none of them did. Thus, the defense should argue, the items could
reasonably be connected to someone other than the defendant as
the real murderer.
The key in Problem 6 is that the collection of physical evidence
did not result in any conclusive connections to the defendant. Notably, the case would be significantly different if the test results positively identified a person other than the defendant. If the testing
resulted in a positive identification of another shooter, then the
prosecutor would have no discretion to withhold the results.38 The
gray area in Problem 6 arises from the inconclusive test results that
do not identify any potential shooter at all. The cumulative nature
of the test results’ failure to identify the defendant as the shooter
suggests that the prosecutor should consider the evidence as
favorable to the defendant. In sum, Brady likely requires disclosure
in Problem 6. Prosecutorial suppression of the test results evidence
in Problem 6 would be an abuse of Brady discretion.
Problem 7: Is the Evidence Admissible?
Problem 7 involves the nondisclosure of an intake note that
could impeach the testimony of Billy, an 11-year-old boy who alleges he was sexually assaulted at a treatment facility for emotionally disturbed children. The note, written by the director of the
facility, indicates that Billy alleged that he was sexually abused by
staff members at his previous treatment facility. The director noted
that Billy expressed a concern that Billy would be sexually assaulted at the new facility, too. The director noted that the new
facility would have to take special precautions to protect its staff
members from false accusations by Billy. The note is arguably exculpatory because it suggests that Billy made false accusations
against caretakers in the past.
The note, however, presents important evidentiary problems.
The note appears to consist of a statement that contains double
38. See, e.g., Barbee v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 845–47 (4th
Cir. 1964) (finding prosecutor’s failure to disclose a ballistics report showing defendant’s gun did not fire the murder bullet violated due process).
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hearsay: first, the note itself, which is written by the director, is
hearsay; and second, the director refers to statements made by persons at the previous facility that indicate that Billy’s accusations
were false. The prosecution could argue a hearsay exception for
the admissibility of the note as a business record.39 No hearsay exception appears available, however, to admit the staff personnel
statements contained in the note. If the prosecutor has a valid evidentiary basis for concluding that the note is not admissible, does
the prosecutor have the discretion to conceal the note from the
defense?
The Supreme Court has not definitively decided whether a
piece of evidence’s admissibility is a precondition that triggers a
prosecutor’s disclosure duty.40 Several courts have taken the position that unless the information is admissible, then the prosecution
need not disclose the information.41 Other courts have drawn the
opposite conclusion and have rejected admissibility as a criterion
for determining the applicability of Brady.42 The courts that do not
require admissibility for mandatory Brady disclosure consider
whether the inadmissible evidence would have led to admissible evidence43 or would be useful to the defense in structuring its case.44
As long as the inadmissible evidence would have led to admissible
evidence or would have been useful to the defense, then the prosecution should disclose the information.
A prosecutor who believes that admissibility of the evidence is
a precondition to disclosure has a valid discretionary basis to withhold evidence that might be highly relevant to the defense. In
Problem 7, the defense might be able to use the hearsay evidence to
discredit the complainant. The defense, however, cannot properly
suggest that the prosecutor is acting in violation of Brady in making
a discretionary judgment based on evidentiary admissibility. A
39. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (providing business records are not excluded by
the rule against hearsay).
40. Cf. Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1995) (suggesting that admissibility is precondition for Brady disclosure); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–90
(1963) (finding co-defendant’s undisclosed confession could not have affected verdict because it was inadmissible).
41. See Madsen v. Dormire, 137 F.3d 602, 604–05 (8th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Derr, 990 F.2d 1330, 1335–36 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
42. See Barton v. Warden, S. Ohio Corr. Facility, 786 F.3d 450, 465–66 (6th
Cir. 2015) (finding inadmissible hearsay would have led to admissible evidence);
Ellsworth v. Warden, N.H. State Prison, 333 F.3d 1, 5–6 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding
hearsay statement by victim may have led to discovery of witnesses to corroborate
information contained in statement).
43. See Barton, 786 F.3d at 465–66; Ellsworth, 333 F.3d at 5–6.
44. See Jones v. Jago, 575 F.2d 1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1978).

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\123-3\DIK304.txt

684

unknown

Seq: 24

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

23-APR-19

14:32

[Vol. 123:661

prosecutor may, after analyzing the evidence and the rules of admissibility, reasonably conclude that the evidence is legally inadmissible. In many jurisdictions, the prosecutor’s reasonable conclusion
that the evidence is inadmissible places the evidence within her discretion not to disclose.
The determination that the prosecution may conceal the note
because of evidentiary rules may seem troubling. The prosecutor’s
discretionary decision not to disclose the director’s note, however
well-based legally, does raise ethical concerns. A prosecutor should
be committed to serving justice and to ensuring that defendants
have a fair opportunity to challenge the prosecution’s case. Indeed,
the policy underlying Brady suggests that even if the evidence may
be inadmissible, the evidence may still provide a promising lead to
exculpatory evidence. If inadmissible evidence could lead to exculpatory evidence, then the prosecution has no reasonable basis to
withhold the otherwise inadmissible evidence. The note does not
indicate what Billy may have told persons at his previous facility, or
exactly how the director learned of Billy’s accusations. The note
indicates, however, that persons at Billy’s previous facility believed
Billy made complaints that he was sexually molested and that
Billy’s complaints were untrue. The note further indicated that the
director of Billy’s new facility believed that the new facility would
need to take special precautions to protect itself against further
false complaints by Billy.
The prosecutor should reasonably know that if the defense
knew about the note’s contents, the defense would surely undertake
an aggressive investigation of the circumstances surrounding Billy’s
stay at the first facility. With the information from the note, the
defense would try to learn whether Billy’s complaints at the first
facility were false. The defense would be in a position to interview
persons at the first facility, as well as the director of Billy’s present
facility. An interview with the director who interviewed Billy and
his parents before accepting Billy’s placement and made the note
would likely prove significant for the defense. Depending on the
results of that investigation, the defense might be armed with relevant and credible evidence to attack Billy’s credibility. On balance,
the prosecutor’s decision not to disclose the intake note on the basis
of its inadmissibility is arguably an unreasonable exercise of Brady
discretion.
Problem 8: Is the Evidence Relevant?
Problem 8 involves the nondisclosure of information from an
eyewitness who identifies a killer who is neither of the two persons
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charged with the murder. A prosecutor making a good-faith determination whether to disclose the witness evidence would likely
have serious doubts about the witness’s reliability. The prosecutor
would likely conclude that the witness made a mistake, that her
identification is unreliable, and that disclosure would enable the defense to introduce untrustworthy evidence. Further, the prosecutor
could reasonably conclude that disclosure of the witness might confuse the jury and diminish the strength of the prosecutor’s case.
Does a prosecutor have discretion under Brady not to disclose the
information from the eyewitness?
The additional eyewitness evidence could not affect Ed, who
admitted his participation in the murder and testified for the prosecution. The eyewitness evidence does appear to be favorable to
Drago, however, because the witness evidence suggests that someone who looks like Drago was the shooter. Although the police
and prosecutor have discounted the evidence as unreliable, the evidence would provide the defense with a basis to exculpate Drago.
A prosecutor seeking to enforce her Brady duty responsibly must
try to anticipate how the defense might use evidence in preparing
or presenting its case. For example, if Drago argued that Ed was
the shooter and Drago waited in the car, the conclusion would logically follow that the witness’s identification of a perpetrator other
than Drago and Ed was clearly a mistake. If, however, Drago
claimed an alibi, then the identification of Martin might appear less
of a mistake and support Drago’s alibi.
In Problem 8, however, the prosecutor has solid proof linking
Drago to the killing. Ed admits to being an accomplice and claims
that Drago was the actual killer. The facts do not suggest that Ed
has a motive to make up a story to falsely identify Drago as a participant. Sally, who appears to have no motive to lie, has testified
that Drago told her he shot the clerk. Finally, the police discovered
the gun used in the killing near the residence where Drago lived
with Sally.
Problem 8 may be an instance in which a prosecutor could
properly consider the relevance of the evidence as bearing on
whether to disclose. The relevance of the evidence is dependent on
the defense’s theory of the case. Consider, for example, that Drago
claims Ed was the shooter. If Drago claims that Ed was the
shooter, the evidence would be of no value. The eyewitness evidence suggesting a different shooter altogether would not be of
value because the jury would have to determine whether Drago or
Ed was the actual shooter. The jury would have to decide whether
the shooter was Drago or Ed, however, and would likely not con-
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sider a third person. Even if Drago claims an alibi, the jury would
still have to discount the testimony of Ed and Sally, as well as the
discovery of the gun. Ed and Sally’s testimony and the gun all link
Drago to the murder. The eyewitness’s contradictory identification
of Martin, instead of Drago, would have to overcome the strong
evidentiary value that the testimony and gun provide. The jury
would have to assume that Martin, who appears to be a stranger to
the case and does not know Drago or Ed, was somehow involved in
the killing. A jury would be unlikely to accept the witness’s identification of Martin. Without any more basis in the evidence that
Martin was somehow involved, the jury would likely not know how
to fit the witness’s identification of Martin into the case. A prosecutor exercising Brady discretion responsibly would logically ask
whether Wendi’s identification of Martin would have any significance in causing a rational jury to acquit Drago.
The defense certainly has a basis to argue that the prosecutor,
in the proper exercise of Brady discretion, should disclose the evidence about Martin. If the jurisdiction had an open file policy, the
prosecution would likely disclose the eyewitness identification of
Martin. In a non-open file jurisdiction, however, a prosecutor has a
significant amount of discretion to decide what evidence to disclose.
Problem 8 presents a tricky disclosure question. The prosecutor
could opt for disclosure and then easily rebut the proof. Alternatively, the prosecutor could conceal the evidence in the good-faith
belief that it is irrelevant and its use would only confuse and distract
the jury.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Each of the problems presents a challenging decision for a
prosecutor seeking to comply with Brady. Each problem requires
the prosecutor to fairly and responsibly decide whether Brady requires the disclosure of evidence. Each problem is a relatively close
call, both legally and factually. Whether a court would find that the
prosecutor violated her Brady duty in any of the problems would
depend on how the court views the scope of the prosecutor’s Brady
discretion. The reviewing court would also consider the basis for
the prosecutor’s decision not to disclose the evidence. As the discussion of the problems suggests, a prosecutor who possesses evidence that may be of some value to a defendant is not necessarily
required to disclose that evidence. Prosecutors have room to exercise some discretion over whether to disclose the evidence.
The discussions of the problems illustrate many of the pertinent factors that a prosecutor would likely consider when seeking
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to enforce her Brady obligation fairly and responsibly. A prosecutor should understand that significant doubts about whether the evidence ought to be disclosed should be resolved in favor of
disclosure. Thus, Problem 4, which involved unrelated evidence
from a defense witness that the defense may not have known about;
Problem 6, which involved inconclusive scientific tests on several
items of clothing that the defendant wore; and Problem 7, which
involved arguably inadmissible evidence that could have led to admissible evidence, each require the prosecutor to disclose the evidence. The prosecutor should disclose the evidence in question
because the prosecutor would have no significant doubt that the
evidence would assist the defense. Further, the prosecutor should
disclose the evidence because the defense does not face any substantial legal impediments to effectively using the evidence.
By contrast, a prosecutor cannot always anticipate how the defense might use the evidence in either preparing or presenting its
case. A prosecutor, however, can be skeptical about whether the
defense could use the evidence effectively. So, in Problem 1, which
involved information that a key defense witness may be under investigation, and in Problem 8, which involved an apparent misidentification of a perpetrator by a witness, a prosecutor could properly
conclude that the evidence would be of minimal or no value in assisting the defense. If the evidence in question would be of minimal
or no value to the defense, the prosecution may decide not to disclose. In Problem 2, which involved seemingly exculpatory blood
tests by an incompetent chemist, the prosecutor could make a similar determination: that the evidence is unreliable and could not assist the defense. In Problem 2, however, the prosecutor should not
preempt the defense’s determination about whether to use the evidence at issue. Therefore, in Problem 2, the prosecution should arguably disclose the chemist’s findings and the evidence
undermining the accuracy of those findings and should allow the
defense to decide how to use the evidence.
Moreover, a prosecutor likely understands that Brady was not
intended to displace the adversary system. The defense has responsibility to demonstrate not only that the evidence in the hands of
the prosecutor would have made a difference to its case, but also
that the defense did not have access to that evidence. To qualify as
Brady material, access to the evidence must be held solely by the
prosecutor. As Problem 4 shows, however, the belief that the defense could obtain the evidence through a reasonably diligent investigation might inform the prosecutor’s decision whether to disclose.
If the defense could obtain the evidence through a reasonably dili-
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gent investigation, the prosecutor might conclude that the responsibility to uncover the evidence lies with the defendant. If the
defense can reasonably uncover the evidence with diligent investigation, the prosecutor is not under obligation to disclose the evidence. The prosecutor who fails to disclose evidence under the
theory that the defense should be able to uncover it with reasonable
investigation, however, may exercise discretion inconsistent with
the spirit of Brady. A prosecutor who decides to conceal evidence
in the belief that the defendant could find the evidence may be exercising prosecutorial discretion too narrowly.
Similar to the prosecution’s failure to disclose on the basis that
the defense could uncover evidence through reasonable investigation, a prosecutor arguably misuses discretion when she fails to disclose based on the conclusion that the evidence would not be
admissible. Some prosecutors conclude that if evidence would be
inadmissible, then the prosecution does not have a requirement to
disclose the evidence. However, Problem 7, which involves the
youth treatment intake note, illustrates that a discretionary determination based on evidentiary admissibility is arguably much too
narrow. Even if the evidence in question is not itself admissible, a
prosecutor should ask whether, through further investigation, the
inadmissible evidence could lead to admissible evidence. As Problem 5 illustrates, a prosecutor should also know that the absence of
an explicit promise to a cooperating witness does not preclude
Brady obligations. The witness might reasonably believe that he
would receive favorable treatment for his cooperation based on the
prosecutor’s statements. If the witness could have a reasonable basis to believe he will receive a benefit, a reviewing court may infer
from all of the facts that the prosecution had made a tacit sentencing promise to the witness. When a reviewing court finds that a
tacit sentencing promise existed, the court would likely find the
promise to be covered by Brady. If the prosecutor made a tacit
sentencing promise, then the prosecutor must not allow the witness
to testify otherwise.
Finally, as Problem 3, which was the work product example,
suggests, a prosecutor need not disclose opinions that he or his staff
have formed about the case or the credibility of witnesses. Nevertheless, a prosecutor cognizant of her Brady duty should be sensitive to the concerns that Brady meant to address. The
conscientious prosecutor should seek to ascertain if any factual basis exists for her colleagues’ adverse conclusions and opinions. If a
factual basis does exist for the adverse opinion, a prosecutor seeking to enforce Brady responsibly should disclose the opinion and
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the basis for the opinion. The prosecutor should acknowledge that
while work product privilege can protect opinions from disclosure,
in some instances, a prosecutor’s commitment to the fair and responsible enforcement of Brady should override the privilege.
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